Liberalization and FDI Performance: Evidence from ASEAN and SAFTA Member Countries by unknown
Journal of Economic Structures (2014) 3:6
DOI 10.1186/s40008-014-0006-z
R E S E A R C H A RT I C L E Open Access
Liberalization and FDI Performance: Evidence
from ASEAN and SAFTA Member Countries
Muhammad Shariat Ullah · Kazuo Inaba
Received: 7 April 2014 / Revised: 16 October 2014 / Accepted: 20 October 2014 /
© 2014 Ullah and Inaba; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
credited.
Abstract The developing and least developed countries in the South and Southeast
Asia have emerged as dynamic hosts of foreign direct investment; and inbound FDI
growth surpassed that of the developing world during the decade 2001–2010. Yet
foreign investment continues to flow quite unevenly into individual countries in the
region, although majority of the Asian countries do emphasize liberalization unilat-
erally, bilaterally under the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) and the bilateral trade
agreement (BTA), and regionally under the regional trade agreement (RTA). Under
such scenarios, this study empirically assesses FDI determinants with a specific focus
on the FDI effects of BIT, BTA, and RTA as well as of factors pertaining to institu-
tional quality. Gravity-type econometric results of unbalanced panel data uncover that
BIT, BTA, and RTA promote FDI insignificantly. It appears that the role of bilateral
instruments in stimulating the inflow of foreign capital diminishes if liberal FDI poli-
cies already exist in the host country. Under such circumstances, the quality of the
host country’s legal and regulatory environment exerts a profound influence on firms’
investment decisions. Nonetheless, core gravity variables are found to be important
determinants of FDI.
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1 Introduction
South and Southeast Asian countries are integrated under two distinct regional trade
blocs, namely the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation1 (SAFTA) and
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations2 (ASEAN). Owing either to a percep-
tion of bolstering economic prosperity or to overcoming an economic crisis by in-
jecting foreign capital and technology, developing and least developed participants3
of these trade blocs’ undertook unilateral opening to international investments over
recent decades. Consequently, FDI policies—i.e., national treatment, equity ceiling,
sectoral opening, profit repatriation, and foreign exchange control—were gradually
softened. Nonetheless, ASEAN and SAFTA members have maneuvered a wide range
of fiscal incentives so as to remain more competitive and to feature attractive invest-
ment locations. Alongside the unilateral opening to FDI, these economies have signed
an extensive number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) over time.4 In addition,
some countries have attempted to complement the investment liberalization process
by forming bilateral trade agreements (BTAs); these are like free trade agreements
(FTAs) that also contain provisions for stimulating investment at a bilateral level.
In the wake of the speedy liberalization of restrictions on FDI, coupled with a
rising trend in the dislocation of operations by multinational enterprises (MNEs) to
access locational advantages, South and Southeast Asia emerged as key destinations
for inbound FDI. The Asian Development Bank (2007) reported that the liberaliza-
tion of investment barriers by developing countries in Asia resulted in an upward
trend of FDI flow into the region in recent years. Furthermore, the FDI flows to
South and Southeast Asia exceeded FDI growth in developing countries in other re-
gions (UNCTAD 2010). Although the developing and LDC members of ASEAN and
SAFTA actively invite FDI by formulating investment-friendly policies, by offering
incentives as a way to deliver higher competitiveness to the foreign firms, and by
1Regional cooperation in South Asia began with the formation of the South Asian Association for Re-
gional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 by seven South Asian countries. Subsequently, the SAARC mem-
bers signed the South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) in 1993 and transformed the SAPTA
into the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004. Some of the SAARC members also belong
to the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA). See Ullah and Inaba (2012) for details on the regionalization
of South Asian countries.
2Member states of ASEAN have instituted far-reaching liberalization to facilitate and coordinate invest-
ment liberalization within the region since the late 1990s. In particular, the creation of the ASEAN Invest-
ment Area (AIA) in 1998 was a milestone initiative in the area of regional cooperation through investment
liberalization. Plummer and Cheong (2009) provide a comprehensive literature on liberalization initiatives
under the ASEAN.
3By referring to developing and least-developed participants of ASEAN and SAFTA, this research indi-
cates nine countries, i.e., Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam. This study selects these nine sample countries because it aims to unveil the de-
terminants of FDI from the perspective of receiving countries that stand at a similar stage of economic
development, offer comparable degree of liberalization but exhibit noticeable variation in hosting FDI.
Countries like Singapore and Malaysia simultaneously receive and undertake FDI and therefore have been
excluded from the analysis. In addition, some countries like Sri Lanka and Laos could not be included in
the sampling frame because of non-availability of data.
4The total number of BITs implemented by the nine sample countries increased remarkably from 24 to
281 between 1990 and 2011.
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entering into a growing number of BITs, the performance in FDI attraction differs
substantially among them. Hence, the critical question is what factors govern MNEs’
decisions in choosing locations for investment.
Analyzing the FDI data of eight Asian countries—Hong Kong, Taiwan, Re-
public of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand—
Chantasasawat et al. (2010) report that openness and corporate taxes are the driving
forces of inward FDI in the East and Southeast Asian host countries. Their results fur-
ther indicate that institutional characteristics—i.e., corruption, government stability,
and rule of law—have no significant influence on FDI. Plummer and Cheong (2009)
investigate ASEAN integration and its effects on FDI. Their findings demonstrate
that BITs have insignificant positive effects on FDI inflow to the ASEAN countries.
Vogiatzoglou (2007) unveil that the volume of bilateral trade between host and home
countries, bilateral vertical production specialization links between them, interna-
tional integration, degree of openness, growth rates, labor cost, and macroeconomic
instability in the host country are the main determinants of FDI inflows from the se-
lected OECD countries to the nine East Asian host countries (i.e., China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand).
While some studies addressed many aspects of FDI determinants, the role of in-
vestment treaties has been inadequately explored. Therefore, the present research at-
tempts to examine FDI effects of BITs in the nine Asian countries in which a grow-
ing momentum in signing BITs has been prevalent. Apart from that, we discern the
impact of bilateral investment agreements (BTAs) on firms’ choices for investment
locations. Developing and LDC member states of ASEAN and SFTA primarily at-
tract vertical FDI, in which the investing firms tend to export the output from the host
country. In this case, FDI and trade act as complements to one another. Owning to
a complementary relationship between vertical investment and trade (Gast and Her-
rmann 2008), BTAs are likely to constitute an integral determinant of inward FDI.
In particular, BTAs between the Southern and Northern countries can stimulate FDI
from the latter to the former.
Furthermore, we assess the role of institutional quality in attracting inward FDI by
examining law and order as well as corruption and internal conflict. Effects of these
factors in the context of ASEAN and SAFTA countries have rarely been addressed in
past studies. Because the sample hosts have already implemented an open-door policy
toward foreign investment and they have maneuvered competitive incentive packages,
institutional development might act as the driving force of future FDI inflows. There-
fore, we aim to contribute by ascertaining the required institutional reforms to benefit
from investment-friendly policies and incentives. The rest of the paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 compares FDI policies and performance of the sample countries.
Section 3 presents literature on FDI determinants. Section 4 outlines the econometric
model and analyzes the empirical results. Finally, Sect. 5 gives the conclusion.
2 FDI Policy and Performance
2.1 Evolution of Investment Policies
FDI policies in the developing and LDC countries of SAFTA and ASEAN have un-
dergone far-reaching changes in recent decades. These capital-deficient countries still
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strive for FDI by lowering barriers to capital inflows. Nonetheless, countries compet-
ing for inward FDI also grant fiscal stimuli to allure foreign investors, which has
resulted in a “proliferation of incentives” (OECD 2004). In order to keep pace with
the changing business environment and global business rules, FDI-seeking countries
amend their investment statutes quite frequently. Alongside the current investment
provisions, Tables 1 and 2 exhibit a brief summary of FDI policy evolution in se-
lected countries.5 It is evident that investment liberalization at the country level began
at different points of time and at varying degrees. Overall, the phase of liberalization
in Southeast Asia preceded that of South Asia. In particular, three Southeast Asian
countries—Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines—relaxed some of their regula-
tions on FDI in the 1960s and 1970s. Thailand pioneered the introduction of the tax
holiday in 1960, followed by Indonesia in 1967.6 Indonesia moved first in some areas
including eliminating the ceiling on foreign equity holding, granting national treat-
ment, guaranteeing against expropriation, and allowing concessional duty on import.
By the 1970s, Thailand and the Philippines also instituted liberal FDI policies, sim-
ilar to Indonesia. Vietnam joined the club of liberal economies in the late 1980s and
adopted a liberal FDI policy regime by the early 1990s.
In South Asia, the liberalization of FDI policies commenced prior to the imple-
mentation of broad-based economic reforms. In particular, Bangladesh and Pakistan
opened the door to foreign investors in the early 1980s, although these countries
have changed their direction from import substitution to an export-led growth strat-
egy since the early 1990s. India was relatively restrictive to FDI until the beginning
of the 1990s. Although India opened the first export processing zone (EPZ) in Asia
in 1965, the FDI policy of the country at that time was highly restrictive, and in-
dustrialization was controlled by protected domestic sectors with a focus on import
substitution strategy.
Although the initial journey of softening FDI policies in South and Southeast Asia
ranged from the 1960s to the 1990s, investment policies gradually converged, and the
current state of the policies and incentives mostly demonstrates similar attributes.7
Table 2 shows that SAFTA and ASEAN countries compete head to head in relation
to offering generalized investment incentives and concessions. In some cases, even,
smaller countries, like Bangladesh and Vietnam, offer more a liberal atmosphere than
the bigger markets.
2.2 FDI Trends in ASEAN and SAFTA Countries
Table 3 compares the growth trends of inward FDI in developing countries across the
globe, in the Asian countries as a whole, and in the nine sample countries that belong
to either ASEAN or SAFTA. It is evident that during the 1990s, the aggregate growth
of FDI in the nine selected hosts in Asia lagged behind FDI growth in the developing
5The FDI policy of Cambodia and Myanmar could not be compared due to data limitation.
6Indonesia revoked tax holiday on FDI from the year 1984 under the Law Number 7 passed in 1983. Since
then, the government usually grants some tax concessions that ease tax burden of investors.
7In addition to the policies and incentives summarized in Table 2, every country designs some sector-
specific policies and incentive packages.
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Table 3 Comparison of net inward FDI growth (period average)
Regions Period
1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010
Developing World 27.8 17.9 8.6 13.5
South, East, and Southeast Asia 31.4 14.2 6.1 13.0
9 sample countries of ASEAN/SAFTA 20.7 −7.8 36.8 16.3
Source: Authors’ calculations from the UNCTAD’s data
Table 4 Inward FDI as % of total inflows in nine countries (period average)
Host country Period
1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010
Bangladesh 0.2 3.8 2.8 1.4
Cambodia 0.8 1.6 1.0 1.1
India 8.1 24.5 37.3 48.4
Indonesia 28.9 −3.1 1.2 13.0
Myanmar 2.5 3.7 1.6 1.1
Pakistan 5.8 3.8 5.5 6.5
Philippines 13.9 14.1 5.4 3.9
Thailand 26.3 37.9 35.0 13.7
Vietnam 12.6 13.6 9.7 11.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UNCTAD’s data set
world as well as the growth achieved by the entire Asian region. In particular, the
sample countries suffered from a negative flow during the last half of the 1990s, which
was primarily due to the Asian financial crisis. The negative growth of FDI during the
second half of the 1990s was greatly related to the substantial outflow of FDI from
Indonesia. However, FDI growth of those economies during the first decade of the
present century surpassed the growth achieved by the developing world and also by
the developing Asian region. In particular, during the period 2001–2005, SAFTA and
ASEAN countries witnessed spectacular growth in hosting FDI. Although the rate of
FDI growth in these developing countries declined from 36.8% during 2001–2005
to 16.3% between 2006–2010, their achievement was better than that of developing
world and of South, East, and Southeast Asia.
2.3 Relative Share in Regional FDI Inflows
Even though developing Asia witnessed an FDI boom over the past decade, few coun-
tries hosted the lion’s share. Table 4 presents country-specific FDI share during 1991–
2010.
The salient features of FDI share can be summarized as follows: (1) India’s share
of inward FDI in Asia consistently rose at a remarkable rate, while that of the Philip-
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pines shrank constantly; (2) recent FDI inflows tended to be more concentrated on
India, Indonesia, and Vietnam; (3) India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam’s share
increased during 2006–2010 over the preceding period’s share; (4) Bangladesh, Cam-
bodia, and Myanmar accounted for a marginal share of the total regional FDI inflows;
(5) Thailand hosted a dominant portion of total inward FDI until 2005, but its share
substantially dropped during the subsequent period; (6) over time, the share of FDI
for the Philippines worsened more than all of the remaining countries.
3 Literature on FDI Determinants
Empirical analyses of FDI determinants have been a key area of research for a long
time. Since the 1990s, the rapid expansion of MNEs’ operations has led to a sub-
stantial growth of FDI in the world that has outpaced the growth of world trade and
output. For instance, during the period of 1990 to 2010, the average growth rate of
inward FDI in the world was 13.2 percent, as compared to 8.1 and 2.6 percent av-
erage growth rates of world trade and output, respectively.8 A healthier growth rate
of world FDI for decades has provided the impetus for exploring the reasons that
firms undertake FDI. Research in this area is still advancing at a rapid rate, owing
to the increased orientation of FDI from developed countries to developing ones that
have heterogeneous characteristics. Some empirical studies focus on country case,
while many others analyze FDI by pooling together developed countries (DCs) and
less-developed countries (LDCs). Nonetheless, studies that aim to ascertain factors
affecting FDI and its effect on specific economies are still in their infancy (Blonigen
2005). This is particularly true with respect to LDCs (Blonigen and Wang 2004).
Caves (1996) and Blonigen (2005) provide authoritative surveys of various strands
of literature on FDI determinants. Besides, Chakrabarti (2001) presents a list of po-
tential factors available in a vast array of cross-country studies on the determinants of
FDI, and the research shows further examination of robustness of partial correlations
between the level of inward FDI and a wide range of economic factors.
Overtime, the analytical focus of empirical models on the factors determining FDI
has shifted from traditional determinants of locational advantages to policy-oriented
issues, like exchange rate and openness as well as to the governance and human devel-
opment areas and lately to liberalization under BITs, BTAs, and RTAs. Nevertheless,
“the empirical literature on determinants of FDI is still young enough that most hy-
potheses are still up for grabs” (Blonigen 2005, p. 398). Essentially, there is scanty
and variant evidence of the FDI effects of BITs, more so in the context of developing
and LDC countries, although starting from the 1990s, the world witnessed a rapid
proliferation of BITs. As such, the number of BITs in the world reached 2,756 as of
May 2010, up from 385 at the end of the 1980s (UNCTAD 2000, 2010).9 Busse et al.
(2010) and UNCTAD (2009) find that participation in BITs by developing economies
8Growth rates were calculated by the authors based on UNCTAD data for global FDI and trade and World
Bank data for GDP.
9UNCTAD (2005) reported that 40% of the world’s total BITs were signed between developed and devel-
oping countries, followed by 25% among developing countries and 13% between developed countries.
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positively influences investors’ decisions in choosing alternative locations. A similar
result was reported by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), who analyzed OECD data.
Plummer and Cheong (2009) disclose that BITs signed by the ASEAN countries ex-
ert positive but insignificant effects on inward FDI, while the authors find a negative
significant result for the entire sample of 34 home and 74 host countries. Hallward-
Driemeier (2003) finds little evidence that BITs have stimulated FDI flows from the
OECD to developing countries. Mina (2012) suggests that FDI-seeking countries may
attempt to sign BITs in tandem with improving their institutional functions. Thus, it
is apparent that the literature lacks consensus on the association between FDI and
BITs.
Furthermore, cross-country empirical studies on the FDI effects of BITs and of
institutional characteristics are quite inadequate in the context of countries that are
primarily FDI-receiving, instead of FDI-making. These countries exhibit compara-
ble level of opening to foreign capital and have geographic proximity. Regardless of
this, countries’ performances in hosting FDI differ significantly. Blonigen and Wang
(2004) argue that the factors determining the location of FDI vary systematically
across LDCs and DCs in a way that is not captured by the current empirical models
of FDI. Although some authors, including Chantasasawat et al. (2010), Plummer and
Cheong (2009), and Vogiatzoglou (2007), have examined the determinants of FDI in
East and Southeast Asian countries, these studies analyzed Asian host countries with
dissimilar characteristics, such as major FDI-seeking countries (including Indonesia
and Thailand) as well as major FDI-making countries (like the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, and Singapore). Nonetheless, SAFTA countries were not in the sample.
Hence, the present study attempts to contribute to FDI research by exploring nine
host economies located in the ASEAN and SAFTA regions that grant comparable
policy environments and fiscal incentives under unilateral and bilateral liberalization
schemes but demonstrate noticeable variation in hosting FDI. Furthermore, this re-
search aims to deliver important policy implications for poor performers so as to
increase inward FDI.
4 Empirical Model and Econometric Results
4.1 Model Specification
This study applies the well-known gravity model, which has been well proven as a
robust empirical methodology to model international trade and investment. Tinbergen
(1962) pioneered the use of the gravity model in the field of international trade. Since
the inception of the gravity model in the 1960s, it has been widely applied in the fields
of trade and factor mobility. Over time, it has appeared as the workhorse of ex-post
methodology. Along with numerous applications of the gravity model in empirical
studies of international economics, authors including Anderson (1979), Bergstrand
(1985, 1989), Deardorff (1998), Evenett and Keller (2002), and Feenstra et al. (2001)
have provided theoretical justification for the model. Recent empirics based on sound
theoretical foundations have led to a richer and more accurate estimation and inter-
pretation of the spatial relations described by the gravity model (Anderson 2011).
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Among others, Bellak et al. (2009), Bevan and Estrin (2004), Busse et al. (2010),
Dee and Gali (2003), Gast and Herrmann (2008), Lee and Plummer (2004), Lesher
and Miroudot (2006), Vogiatzoglou (2007), and Wei (2000) have applied the gravity
model to investigate FDI determinants. In line with Newton’s Law of Gravitation, the
econometric model (1) outlines the core form of the gravity model of panel data
ln(FDIij t ) = C + β1 ln(GDPit ) + β2 ln(GDPj t ) + β3 ln(GDPPCit )
+ β4 ln(GDPPCj t ) + β5 ln(DIST ij ) + εij t . (1)
In Eq. (1), ln indicates natural logarithm; i and j stand for home and host country,
respectively; and t stands for the time period. In the panel data model, the inclusion of
time dimension allows the intercept to change over time so as to account for cyclical
influences on the explained variable. εij t stands for time varying composite error that
consists of αi +uijt , where αi denotes country-specific unobserved factors that affect
the flows between i and j , and uijt represents white noise error.
The basic gravity model is usually augmented by incorporating other determinants
that either facilitate or hinder FDI flows; such factors can be related to home coun-
try (i), host country (j ), and country pairs (ij ). Thus, the extended gravity model
takes the form of Eq. (2):
ln(FDIij t ) = C + β1 ln(GDPit ) + β2 ln(GDPj t ) + β3 ln(GDPPCit )
+ β4 ln(GDPPCj t ) + β5 ln(DIST ij ) + γ ′(Z) + εij t . (2)
In Eq. (2), Z represents a vector of other potential determinants of FDI. In the
vector Z, two types of explanatory variables are to be included—i.e., variables that
vary between host countries over time and the variables that vary between country
pairs over time. As the potential determinants of FDI, the regression model of this
study incorporates factors relating to market size, trade policy, human development,
infrastructure, investment policy, and institutional quality. Altogether, this research
includes nine additional variables to Eq. (1); Eq. (3) gives the final model for regres-
sion estimation:
ln(FDIij t ) = C + β1 ln(GDPit ) + β2 ln(GDPj t ) + β3 ln(GDPPCit )
+ β4 ln(GDPPCj t ) + β5 ln(DIST ij ) + β6(HDj t ) + β7 ln(RAILPCj t )
+ β8 ln(OPENj t ) + β9(BTAij t ) + β10(BIT ij t ) + β11(ASEANij t )
+ β12(ASEANJPNij t ) + β13(SAFTAJPNij t ) + β14(LAWj t )
+ β15(CORRUPj t ) + β16(CONFLICTj t ) + εij t . (3)
The variables of Eq. (3) are defined below, while data sources are explained in the
Appendix.
• FDIij t : Annual inward FDI from country i to country j at year t .
• GDPit : Real GDP of source country at year t .
• GDPj t : Real GDP of host country at year t .
• GDPPCit : GDP per capita of home country at year t .
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• GDPPCj t : GDP per capita of host country at year t .
• DIST ij : Geographic distance between source and receiving country.
• HDj t : Human development measured by secondary school enrollment rate of
country j at year t .
• RAILPCj t : Rail line per 100,000 people of country j at year t .
• OPENj t : Openness of country j at year t .
• BTAij t : Bilateral trade agreement between country i and j at year t .
• BIT ij t : Bilateral investment treaty between country i and j at year t .
• ASEANij t : Dummy variable that accounts intra-ASEAN FDI.
• ASEANJPNij t : Dummy variable if Japan is the supplier of FDI to the ASEAN
countries.
• SAFTAJPNij t : Dummy variable if Japan is the supplier of FDI to the SAFTA coun-
tries.
• LAWj t : Index of law and order of host country at year t .
• CORRUPj t : Host country’s index of corruption at year t .
• CONFLICTj t : Index of internal conflict of country j at year t .
The dependent variable is the annual flow of FDI in millions of current US dol-
lars from country i to country j at time t . This research analyzes unbalanced panel
data of annual inward FDI to the nine Asian host countries and from the 23 major
source countries. The sample host countries include six participants (i.e., Cambodia,
Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam) of ASEAN and three
member states (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) of SAFTA. The data period covers
1995–2010.
Among the drivers of FDI, the most conventionally studied include GDP and GDP
per capita, which indicate market size. Market-seeking FDI tends to flow in large
markets represented by high income in the host country. Chakrabarti (2001) evidences
that among the potential indicators of FDI, the role of market size/per capita GDP of
a host country is the most substantial and robust. Similarly, a source country’s income
promotes FDI because rich countries make higher investments than poor ones. Thus,
FDI is an increasing function of income variables.
Greater geographic distance between countries acts as a deterrent to FDI flow.
Distance lowers the magnitude of investment not only because of the higher cost
of investment but also owing to increased cultural dissimilarities between two dis-
tant countries than that of two proximate countries. Trade-related costs arising from
greater geographic distance tend to exert more influence on MNCs that engage in
vertical FDI. Based on Markusen’s knowledge capital model (Markusen 2002), one
of the key determinants of vertical FDI is lower trade costs. Under this consideration,
the distance variable is expected to exhibit a negative sign.
The development of human capital in the host country is an important stimulus
for FDI. Upon examining the role of the human capital level on FDI inflows in de-
veloping countries, Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) reveal that human capital of the host
country is one of the most important forces of FDI attraction, and its importance has
become greater over time. In a similar vein, Reiter and Steensma (2010) explain that
FDI inflows in developing countries are strongly affected by improvement in the hu-
man development of the host country. Multinationals can improve their operational
efficiency and strengthen their competiveness by investing in a country that possesses
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qualified manpower. The current study captures the level of human capital by the host
country’s secondary school enrollment ratio.
Infrastructure is considered to be a crucial factor to induce foreign investment.
An increase in the host country’s infrastructure endowment is capable of attracting
more FDI (Bellak et al. 2009). The literature on FDI determinants suggests a wide
variety of measures of infrastructure—i.e., road density, paved road density (Vogiat-
zoglou 2007), rail line density (Bellak et al. 2009), Internet users, telephone users
(Chantasasawat, et al. 2010), and electricity consumption. In this research, we use
the host country’s rail line per capita as the measure of the infrastructure.
This research employs four indicators: trade openness, BIT, BTA, and RTA, all
of which account for a country’s extent of investment liberalization. Openness to in-
ternational trade plays a complementary role to FDI inflow. Trade openness softens
impediments to trade that ultimately facilitate the import of materials and machinery
as well as export to foreign markets. Former studies have reported a positive rela-
tionship between openness and inward FDI. The concept of openness is very broad
and can be measured by incorporating various policy aspects of the goods market, the
service market, and the capital market. However, the simplest way to assess openness
is to examine the measurement of trade as a percentage of GDP. Thus, the degree of
openness in the host country is calculated in the following way:
OPENj t = EXPORTj t + IMPORTj t
GDPj t
.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) are the
prime avenues of investment liberalization at a bilateral level. BITs encourage for-
eign investment reciprocally by lowering barriers, ensuring protection, and granting
incentives, while BTAs promote both trade and investment liberalization through the
reduction of trade and investment regulations. In their efforts to attract and benefit
from FDI, host countries attempt to liberalize and customize investment provisions
by negotiating BITs and BTAs. Therefore, the growth of BITs and BTAs should be
positively associated with inward FDI.
The integration of economies under regional trade agreements (RTAs) has been
growing around the globe at an increasing pace, and more and more RTAs tend to in-
corporate provisions for facilitating intra-regional investment. Southeast Asian coun-
tries foster regional connectivity under ASEAN, while South Asian countries do so
under SAARC. In order to explore the role of ASEAN integration on intra-regional
investment flows, this research incorporates the ASEAN dummy variable. However,
a similar dummy is not used for the SAFTA countries, particularly because this trade
bloc hardly facilitates intra-regional investment. Furthermore, we investigate the ex-
tent of integration of Japan with ASEAN and SAFTA countries by incorporating two
dummies.10 The underlying reason for using these dummy variables is that Japan
is one of the major investing economies in the world, and we endeavor to examine
whether the level of Japanese investment differs between South and Southeast Asia.
10In addition, the roles of China and South Korea have also been examined since these countries’ signifi-
cance is growing over time in both regions.
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A positive significant sign will substantiate that Japan and the sample host countries
belonging to ASEAN and SAFTA are integrated via FDI, while a negative sign will
nullify such intuition. Any divergence in the estimated results for the two sub-regional
groups will underscore the necessity for heightening integration with Japan in order
to host more Japanese multinationals.
Multinationals might respond to political and institutional changes when making
their investment decisions (Plummer and Cheong 2009). FDI inflow and institutional
quality are closely interlinked because high-quality institutions reduce political risk
and ensure smooth operations. A higher degree of political risk is a threat and discour-
ages foreign investment. In order to capture the role of institutional quality on inward
foreign investment, this study takes into account three indices of a host country: the
law and order index, the corruption index, and the index of internal conflict. A host
country’s law and order situation constitutes an integral part of its overall business
environment. A strong and impartial legal system promotes an investment-friendly
environment and heightens investors’ confidence, while a weak law and order con-
dition reflects institutional loopholes and high risk that eventually deters investment.
In particular, a deteriorated law and order condition exerts a direct threat on property
rights. Therefore, the index of law and order should be positively linked with the in-
flow of foreign capital. Another important dimension of political risk is the amount
of corruption that exists in an economy. The intensity of corruption reduces FDI, as
it increases the cost of doing business.11 The final variable of our empirical model
is the host country’s index of internal conflict, which highlights the degree of politi-
cal violence in a country, such as terrorism, civil war, coup threat, and civil disorder.
Persistent conflicts among political parties or between political parties and civilians
frighten actual and potential investors, and this eventually has a profound negative
effect on the future inflow of foreign investment.
4.2 Methodological Aspects
The panel data is suitable for random and fixed effects models, which are superior to
ordinary least squares because unobserved heterogeneity can be accounted for. In a
similar vein to Baldwin (1994), Bellak et al. (2009), and Cuyvers et al. (2011), this
research applied the random effects model with the correction of auto-correlated er-
rors (AR1) detected by the Wooldridge’s (2002) test of serial correlation. Inward FDI
may not be contemporaneously responsive to social, political, and economic changes.
Therefore, following Bellak et al. (2009), Cuyvers et al. (2011), and Egger and Win-
ner (2005), we used one-year-lagged values of the variables, which also helped to
overcome the possibility of endogeneity. We checked the multicollinearity with the
correlation matrix and variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF score of OPENj t was
above the tolerance limit;12 hence, we dropped this variable in the final estimations.
As a result, the mean of the VIF of the final model has substantially dropped and
11Contrary literature on the role of corruption also exists. For example, Egger and Winner (2005) find
corruption as a stimulus for inward FDI to a large set of developed and less-developed countries.
12VIF > 10 is an indication of high collinearity (Baum 2006). Estimates of VIF are not reported.
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was well below the threshold limit. In order to check the specification bias, we con-
ducted RESET tests (Ramsey 1969) as described in Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The
p values of all estimates are insignificant at any level that rules out possibility of any
misspecification.
In the dependent variable, there is missing data for some country pairs in certain
years. The literature on the gravity model suggests that the simplest solution to miss-
ing or zero values in a dependent variable is to omit those observations and confine
the estimation to the rest of the samples (in other words, to make a truncated es-
timation). Baldwin (1994) concluded that zero values do not have much impact on
empirical results. The second alternative is to scale the dependent variable with a
certain value, as done by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995). Moreover, some authors,
including Rose (2004) and Soloaga and Winters (2001), have used the Tobit model
(censored regression) in the presence of zero values in the data set. Following Eichen-
green and Irwin (1995), we scaled the value of the dependent variable with one in the
log transformation process.
Table 5 reports the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. The pair-
wise highest correlations of 0.66 is detected between two measures of institutional
quality—i.e., indices of internal conflict and law and order in the host country. This
justifies the inherent association between a higher index of internal conflict (low in-
tensity of conflict) and a higher index of law and order (better law and order). Con-
sidering this obvious fact, we regressed the institutional quality measures separately.
It appears from the descriptive statistics (see Table 6) that the variability is higher
between country-pairs than within country-pairs for all variables, except the ones that
pertain to the various dimensions of institutional quality. A slightly higher variability
of institutional quality factors within a country-pair indicates relatively unstable and
fluctuating strengths of institutions.
4.3 Empirical Results
Table 7 provides the empirical results of the model set forth in Eq. (3). The findings
clearly establish the expected signs of the key gravity variables—i.e., income and
distance. It appears that the FDI effects of host and home country GDPs are positive
and significant. Nonetheless, the marginal effect of the host GDP exceeds that of
the home GDP, which implies that growth of production capacity in host countries
positively contributes to attract FDI. Higher per-capita income of the host country
motivates the inflow of foreign investment, while that of the home country negatively
affects firms’ decisions to undertake FDI. In other words, a rise in GDP per capita
in host countries motivates inward FDI due to an increase in the market’s buying
capacity. As usual, the geographic distance between home and host country is found
to affect FDI flow at a negative significant rate.
In the extended models (see Regressions II–IX), host countries’ human capital
appears to exert a significant positive effect on the inflow of foreign capital, and this
result is consistent with Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) and Reiter and Steensma (2010).
Development of a railway network in the host country also has expected positive
influence on the FDI decision of multinationals. The estimated coefficients of the
rail line per capita remains significant even after implementing additional control
variables. Thus, infrastructure constitutes a dominant determinant for hosting FDI.
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
ln FDIij Overall 3.64 2.21 −4.60 9.55
Between 1.69 −0.20 7.49
Within 1.47 −3.75 8.56
ln GDPi Overall 27.08 1.60 21.96 30.09
Between 1.59 22.31 29.95
Within 0.19 26.41 27.82
ln GDPj Overall 24.72 1.40 21.67 27.60
Between 1.38 22.23 27.06
Within 0.29 24.01 25.44
ln GDPPCi Overall 9.62 1.06 5.73 10.64
Between 1.05 6.16 10.55
Within 0.15 9.01 10.32
ln GDPPCj Overall 6.47 0.75 4.70 7.91
Between 0.72 5.35 7.70
Within 0.24 5.83 7.22
ln DISTij Overall 8.33 0.82 6.28 9.70
Between 0.82 6.28 9.70
Within 0.00 8.33 8.33
ln HDj Overall 3.93 0.39 2.77 4.44
Between 0.36 3.36 4.38
Within 0.18 3.35 4.41
ln RAILPCj Overall 1.26 0.83 −0.67 2.40
Between 0.83 −0.52 2.34
Within 0.07 1.11 1.54
BTAij Overall 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Between 0.12 0.00 1.00
Within 0.11 −0.35 0.96
BITij Overall 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Between 0.44 0.00 1.00
Within 0.25 −0.47 1.40
ASEANij Overall 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Between 0.34 0.00 1.00
Within 0.12 −0.78 0.47
ASEANJPNij Overall 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Between 0.24 0.00 1.00
Within 0.02 0.00 1.00
SAFTAJPNij Overall 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Between 0.17 0.00 1.00
Within 0.00 0.03 0.03
Journal of Economic Structures (2014) 3:6 Page 17 of 24
Table 6 (Continued)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
ln LAWj Overall 1.18 0.30 0.04 1.61
Between 0.19 0.80 1.47
Within 0.24 0.41 1.71
ln CORRUPj Overall 0.66 0.36 0.00 1.39
Between 0.20 0.18 0.91
Within 0.30 0.05 1.40
ln CONFLICTj Overall 2.12 0.22 1.41 2.48
Between 0.14 1.95 2.38
Within 0.17 1.56 2.50
This research indicates that investment liberalization by entering into BTAs and
BITs fails to promote FDI in developing countries in Asia. Plummer and Cheong
(2009) also report a similar result for the BITs of ASEAN countries. Although this
research has produced the desired positive signs of the estimated coefficients of both
variables, the results lack statistical significance at any level, even with two years of
lag from the year of implementation. This finding discloses the fact that BTAs and
BITs have no beneficial effect on firms’ FDI initiative.
Like bilateral liberalization, integration under ASEAN promotes intra-ASEAN in-
vestment at an insignificant rate. Hence, ASEAN countries are yet to gain a wor-
thy effect of creating AIA. Similarly, the investment relationship between Japan and
ASEAN countries lacks statistical significance. On the contrary, the investment effect
of Japan on SAFTA countries is negative and highly significant. This result reveals
that SAFTA countries are less integrated with Japan than that ASEAN countries.
As a result, countries in South Asia receive a significantly lower flow of FDI from
Japan than that of countries in East Asia. Because Japan is a dominant source of FDI,
SAFTA countries need to foster relations with Japan.13
Among the three indicators pertaining to institutional quality, the law and order
situation has a profound impact on inward FDI. This result is consistent with the
literature (Busse and Groizard 2008; Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol 2012) and
proves that the host countries possessing higher levels of institutional strength will
benefit from the increased flow of FDI. In other words, countries with a vulnerable
law and order situation are less likely to benefit from booming FDI in Asia. The
extent of corruption in the FDI-receiving country shows no statistical implication,
although the expected sign is evident. Chantasasawat et al. (2010) also report an in-
significant effect of corruption on FDI inflow to Latin America, East and Southeast
Asia, and China. Finally, empirical results show that a firm’s decision to implement
13The estimated results with additional dummies for examining the role of China and Korea as a supplier
of FDI to the ASEAN and SAFTA countries evidence that FDI linkage between ASEAN and China is
positive significant while such relationship is absent in case of SAFTA. In fact, China does not appear at
all as a supplier of FDI to the SAFTA countries. On the contrary, FDI effect of Korea is insignificant in the
case of both ASEAN and SAFTA.
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FDI projects in Asian developing countries is not significantly impacted by the host
country’s index of internal conflict.
5 Conclusion
Developing and least developed members of ASEAN and SAFTA have implemented
far-reaching initiatives to liberalize FDI policies, and they are still advancing toward
a more competitive opening to trigger economic growth through technology trans-
fer, employment generation, and productivity boosts. Over time, they have designed
closely matched policy environments and fiscal incentives to attract foreign investors.
However, the performance in FDI attraction is quite uneven and also disappointing
for some countries. We, therefore, attempted to empirically examine the role of lib-
eralization on capital inflow. The main focus of the study was to unveil the effect of
BIT, BTA, and RTA on FDI. This study also discerns Japan’s role as a source of FDI
in ASEAN and SAFTA countries, which, in turn, discloses the degree of integration
between the source and recipients of FDI. Furthermore, we assess the criticality of
some factors pertaining to the institutional strengths of the host countries.
In this paper, the econometric results provide evidence that neither BITs nor BTAs
constitute a strategic instrument for inducing foreign investment in the developing
countries in Asia. Such estimates bring to light the fact that extensive engagement
in bilateral agreements has less opportunity to foster the inflow of foreign capital if
liberal FDI policies already exist in the host countries and they compete for verti-
cal investment. Because the developing countries in Asia have long been practicing
competitive liberalization of FDI regulations, there is less room for them to design
convincing and customized incentives under BITs and BTAs. Therefore, some of the
sample host countries have failed to stimulate their performance in hosting foreign
investment, although they have signed a substantial number of investment agreements
over time and even with dominant homes of FDI. For instance, an investment agree-
ment between Japan and Bangladesh went into force in August 1999 and between
Japan and Pakistan in May 2002. In spite of a long period of existence of those BITs,
Bangladesh and Pakistan host a very negligible portion of their annual FDI from
Japan. On the contrary, Thailand received a healthy part of its total annual foreign
investment from Japan, although they implemented a bilateral free trade agreement
only in November 2007.14 Above all, SAFTA countries exhibit a significantly lower
degree of integration with Japan via FDI, although bilateral investment agreements
are prevalent, except between India and Japan.15 In this circumstance, countries in
South Asia may explore other possible avenues for increasing economic and cultural
cooperation with Japan. Like in ASEAN countries, intensifying the extent of integra-
14Milner et al. (2004) provide evidence that FDI from Japan to Thailand generally takes the vertically
integrated nature, in which case Japanese investors locate part of the production process in Thailand and
export back home. In this case, the motive for Japanese investment is to avoid higher labors costs at home.
The authors further argue that Japanese firms seek to utilize the advantage of the US preferential trade
policy toward Thailand and fiscal incentives granted by the Thai government.
15India and Japan signed a bilateral FTA that came into force in August 2011.
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tion and cooperation within the SAFTA region might also contribute to improving
FDI performance of South Asian countries.
Our findings suggest that a host country’s economic growth, development of hu-
man capital, improvement of infrastructure, and better law and order situation pos-
itively affect firms’ investment decisions. Therefore, developing countries need to
prioritize their funding in the fields of education, training, transport, communication
systems, and institutional capacity building in order to strengthen their attractiveness
as potential hosts of FDI. Owing to the negative effect of distance and the positive
outcome of ASEAN integration on inward FDI, intra-ASEAN investment is likely to
increase in the future. Furthermore, ASEAN and SAFTA countries possess compara-
ble comparative advantages and compete for labor-intensive FDI by granting similar
kinds of incentives and treatments. Under this circumstance, the inability to institute
desirable states of legal and regulatory environments act as a major stumbling block
to FDI growth.
Competing Interests
The authors declare that they have neither any financial nor any non-financial competing interests. No
organization has financed this manuscript and no organization will gain anything from the publication of
this paper. The authors neither hold any patents nor currently apply for any patents relating to the contents
of the manuscript.
Authors’ Contributions
The main idea of the paper was proposed by KI and MSU designed the manuscript initially. Both the
authors contributed to the collection and analysis of data and performed all the steps of the proofs in this
research. Both the authors also read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements The authors are thankful to the two anonymous referees for their judicial com-
ments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2013 Spring Conference of the
Japanese Economics Association; the 2013 Spring Conference of the Japan Association for Applied Eco-
nomics; 2013 Asia Pacific Conference: Revitalization and Development, Asia Pacific University, Beppu,
Japan; and the Advances in Business-Related Scientific Research Conference, Venice, Italy, 2013. The
authors express thanks and gratitude to the discussants and participants of conferences for their insightful
comments and suggestions.
Appendix: Variable Explanation and Data Sources
• FDIij t : Annual inflow of FDI from country i to country j at year t came from the
UNCTAD World Investment Report.
• GDPit (GDPj t ): Real GDP of home (host) country at year t were taken from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Missing data were collected
from the UN statistical database. Nominal GDP was converted to real GDP by
using the GDP deflator (2005 = 100).
• GDPPCit (GDPPCj t ): Real GDP per capita of home (host) country at year t were
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
• DIST ij : Geographic distance between capital cities of country i and j was taken
from the CEPII’s distance database.
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• OPENj t : Openness of country j at year t . It measures total trade (export + im-
port) as a percentage of GDP. Export and import data were supplied by the IMF’s
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) CD-ROM.
• HDj t : Human development of the host country is proxied by gross secondary
school enrollment rate, and the data came from the WDI database.
• RAILPCj t : Rail line per 100,000 people of country j at year t . Total length of rail
line network of each host country was generated from various sources, including
the World Development Indicators (WDI), the ASEAN Statistical Year Book, and
the country-specific government database on transport and communication.
• BTAij t : Bilateral trade agreements between countries i and j at year t . The WTO
list of trade agreements provided the data.
• BIT ij t : Bilateral investment treaties between countries i and j at year t until the
June 2012 were obtained from UNCTAD’s country-specific lists of bilateral invest-
ment treaties.
• ASEANij t : It takes the value 1 if countries i and j belong to the ASEAN at time t ;
otherwise, it is zero. This variable measures intra-ASEAN investment flows, and
the expected sign is positive.
• ASEANJPNij t : Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the host country belongs
to ASEAN and the source country is Japan. This variable intends to reveal the
extent of integration between Japan and the ASEAN countries via FDI.
• SAFTAJPNij t : Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the host country belongs
to SAFTA and the source country is Japan. This variable measures the extent of
integration between Japan and the SAFTA countries via FDI.
• LAWj t : Index of law and order of country j at year t was provided by the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The “law” element measures the strength and
impartiality of the legal system, while the “order” element is an assessment of pop-
ular observance of the law. Altogether, the value of this index ranges from 0 to 6
points. A higher score indicates better law and order and is expected to induce FDI
positively. Thus, the index of law and order is expected to show a positive sign.
• CORRUPj t : Index of corruption of country j at year t , which comes from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The total value of the index ranges from
0 to 6. The lower the score, the lower the risk and vice versa. Thus, the index of
corruption is likely to show a negative sign.
• CONFLICTj t : Index of internal conflict of country j at year t was also taken from
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This is an assessment of political
violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The score
of this index ranges from 0 to 12 and is summed up from three subcomponents:
(a) civil war/coup threat; (b) terrorism/political violence; and (c) civil disorder.
A higher score represents a lower intensity of internal conflict, while a lower score
indicates a higher intensity of conflict. The expected FDI effect of internal conflict
index is positive.
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